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SeanM. May 
Despite recent declines, crime remains at the fore-
front of the problems facing society. In a Gallup poll 
conducted earlier this year that asked respondents to 
identify the most important problem facing their com-
munity, crime was the problem cited by 12 percent of 
those surveyed, ranking second behind only education. 
This anxiety about crime is not unjustified; an estimated 
31 million crimes were committed in 1998, translating 
to a victimization rate of roughly 11.5 crimes per 100 
residents. Because crime is a significant concern, it is 
important to understand the causes and consequences of 
criminal activity. This thesis focuses on the relationship 
between work and crime. 
The remarkable decline in both violent and property 
crime during the 1990s, coupled with improved job pros-
pects for low-wage workers, has fueled speculation that 
an improvement in economic conditions may be partly 
responsible for the reduction in crime rates. The first 
chapter of this disseltation, "Wages and Youth Anests," 
addresses the question of whether higher wages cause 
teenagers to commit less crime. The second chapter, 
"The Effect of Criminal Victimization on Employment 
and Income," improves social cost calculations by calcu-
lating earnings losses suffered by victims of violent and 
property crime. The third chapter, "efficient Bootstrap-
ping for GMM" (written jointly with Bryan W. Brown 
and Whitney K. Newey), focuses on inference for gener-
alized method of moments estimators. 
Chapter 1 
Wages and Youth Arrests 
Economists, criminologists, and policy makers have 
long speculated on the relationship between economic 
conditions and crime. Becker (1968) proposed that "a 
rise in the income available in legal activities ... would 
reduce the incentive to enter illegal activities and reduce 
the numbers of offenses." Others have noted that the 
relationship between the economy and crime also runs 
in the opposite direction: high crime rates may inhibit 
economic growth. For example, arrest and incarcera-
tion may lower the future earnings and employment 
prospects of the offender, as suggested by previous 
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studies. In addition, high levels of crime may encour-
age employers to change location or discourage new 
business formation, contributing to slower economic 
growth and a decline in regional employment pros-
pects. The economy and crime may be linked through 
other channels as well. In pmticular, property crime 
rates have been shown to increase with economic 
growth. Criminologists speculate that a strong econ-
omy increases the quantity and value of consumer 
goods that can be stolen, thereby raising the returns to 
property crime. 
The low levels of crime in recent years have gener-
ated renewed interest in this relationship. The National 
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) estimates that 
there were approximately 31 million criminal victim-
izations in 1998, the fewest number recorded since 
1973. This low level of crime is not the result of a 
long, gradual decrease, but rather the result of a recent, 
dramatic reduction in crime. From 1993 to 1998, vio-
lent crime victimization rates have fallen by roughly 27 
percent, and property crime victimization rates have 
seen an even sharper decrease of 32 percent. A variety 
of explanations have been advanced to explain this 
trend: increases in the number of police officers per 
capita and changes in the law enforcement strategies 
used by the police; growth in the number of criminals 
incm'cerated; declines in the drug trade; rising private 
expenditures on security guards and protection; and 
improvements in the labor market prospects of young 
workers. 
The remarkable growth of the U.S. economy in 
recent years has focused attention on this last explana-
tion. Although many studies have examined the rela-
tionship between crime and the economy, these studies 
have (for the most part) measured the effect of unem-
ployment on the level of Clime. Such studies tend to 
find that lower rates of unemployment are associated 
with lower levels of crime but that the effect is moder-
ate in magnitude (Freeman 1999). In addition, even the 
largest estimate of the effect of unemployment on 
crime is too small to explain much of the variation in 
crime. The uncertain conclusions from this empirical 
evidence on the relationship between economic condi-
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tions and crime may be attributed, in part, to two fac-
tors. First, unemployment rates are only one measure 
of the labor market prospects faced by criminals; poten-
tial earnings may also playa role in crime participation 
decisions. Second, previous studies may fail to take 
into account that high crime rates inhibit economic 
growth. This failure may bias estimates of the respon-
siveness of crime to economic conditions. 
This chapter uses exogenous variation in teenage 
wages to address the question of whether youth crime is 
responsive to economic conditions. I compare state-
level changes in the mean log wage of teenagers and the 
change in teenage arrest rates between 1989 and 1992. 
I employ an instrumental variables strategy that uses 
the 1990 and 1991 increases in the federal minimum 
wage as a source of exogenous vmiation in the wages of 
teenagers. Two-stage least squares estimates show that 
while arrest rates for violent crimes do not respond 
strongly to changes in wages, participation in burglary, 
motor vehicle theft, vandalism, and robbery is nega-
tively related to market wages. Using these estimates, 
elasticities of arrest rates with respect to market wages 
are between -1 and -2 for property crime. These 
results suggest that rising wages may account for as 
much as 30 percent of the fall in youth arrest rates in 
recent years. 
Chapter 2 
The Effect of Criminal Victimization on 
Employment and Income 
Despite recent declines, crime remains a major con-
cern. Law enforcement agencies reported 12.5 million 
crimes in 1998, corresponding to roughly 4.6 crimes 
reported per 100 residents. Responses collected in the 
NCVS show that police reports significantly understate 
the level of crime: respondents reported 31 million 
crimes in 1998, a rate of 11.5 victimizations per 100 
residents. 
Society devotes significant resources towm'd pre-
venting crime. In 1997, the criminal justice system had 
a budget on the order of $100 billion, almost half being 
spent on police, a third on corrections, and the remain-
der on the judicial system (Freeman 1999). Law 
enforcement agencies in the United States employed 
0.64 million sworn officers and 0.25 million civilian 
employees in 1998. Including civilian employees, the 
overall law enforcement employment rate was 3.4 
employees per 1,000 residents. In addition to these 
public expenditures, significant private resources were 
allocated to crime prevention activities; Cunningham, 
Strauchs, and Van Meter (1991) reported that private 
expenditures exceeded governmental expenditures by 
73 percent. 
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The combination of both high levels of criminal 
activity and high levels of expenditures on crime pre-
vention leads to the question of whether society allo-
cates the optimal level of resources to crime prevention. 
Analysis of this question requires estimates of the 
social costs of crime that include both direct monetary 
losses (lost property or medical bills, for example) and 
the cost of victims' pain and suffering, as well as indi-
rect costs. Estimates of the first two components of the 
social cost of crime have been made by Perkins et al. 
(1996), who used the NCVS to tabulate victims' esti-
mates of the property loss and medical bills associated 
with crime, and by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, 
and Rossman (1993), who used jury awards to victims 
of crime to measure the costs of victims' pain and suf-
fering. Less is known about the magnitude of the indi-
rect costs of crime. 
In this chapter, I focus on one aspect of the indirect 
cost of crime: decreases in the earnings of victims of 
crime. Psychologists have documented a strong rela-
tionship between posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
and criminal victimization; they have also noted that 
individuals with PTSD suffer from lower employment 
rates as a result of the disorder. In addition, behavior 
undertaken by the victim to guard against repeat vic-
timization may lead to changes in working patterns and, 
subsequently, a reduction in earnings. Victims, for 
exmnple, may choose lower-paying jobs in safer neigh-
borhoods, or may withdraw from the labor market 
entirely if they feel that work exposes them to suffi-
ciently high levels of risk. 
The effect of victimization on the employment status 
of victims is estimated using a longitudinal version of 
the NCVS that contains data on the employment out-
comes and victimization history of a representative 
sample of U.S. households. Multiple observations for 
each individual allow estimation of models that control 
for both observed and unobserved differences between 
victims and non-victims of crime. The results suggest 
that violent crime victimization is associated with a 
transitory decrease in employment rates of between 2 
and 3 percent, but that the decline lasts no more than 18 
months after the victimization. Results for property 
crimes show little effect of victimization on employ-
mentrates. 
Focusing solely on employment as a measure of the 
labor market consequences of crime may undercount 
employment-related costs of crime. For example, in 
order to reduce the risk of repeat victimizations, victims 
may choose to take lower-paying jobs in safer neighbor-
hoods or in locations closer to home. Similarly, victims 
may reduce the number of hours that they work at their 
existing job. Neither of these costs are counted by esti-
mates that focus on employment as the outcome of vic-
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tlmlZation. To address this issue, I limit the sample to 
heads of households and estimate the effect of victim-
ization on household income. Victims of violent crime 
suffer a short-lived decrease in household income of 
between 2 and 3 percent, but there is no income loss 
associated with property crime victimization. 
Estimates of the effect of violent crime on employ-
ment and household income can be used to calculate 
the average earnings loss of crime victims. Using these 
estimates, violent crime is calculated to cost victims an 
average of $700 in lost earnings. These estimates of 
lost earnings are roughly equal to the direct costs of 
injuries and property loss of victimization (Perkins et 
al. 1996), suggesting that indirect costs may be an 
important component of the social cost of crime. On 
the other hand, estimates of lost earnings are signifi-
cantly less than the pain and suffering costs estimated 
by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman 
(1993). For violent crime, estimates of pain and suffer-
ing costs are more than 10 times the combined cost of 
lost or damaged property, medical bills, and lost earn-
ings. The substantial difference between these esti-
mates may be attributed, in part, to selection bias: 
violent crimes that lead to civil lawsuits may have 
higher costs than the average violent crime. Whatever 
the source, the discrepancy suggests that previous esti-
mates of the pain and suffering costs of crime may 
overstate the social cost of crime. 
Chapter 3 
Efficient Bootstrapping for GMM 
There are many important applications of general-
ized method of moments (GMM) estimators for cross-
section and panel data. For example, there are a wide 
variety of GMM estimators for dynamic panel models. 
Also, instrumental vmiables estimators, which m'e also 
GMM estimators, are important in the estimation of 
treatment effects. It is well known that the usual 
asymptotic theory can be a poor approximation to the 
distribution of the estimators, particularly when there 
are many overidentifying restrictions or when the 
parameters of interest are not well identified. The boot-
strap provides one approach to improvements in the 
approximation; this chapter describes a relatively effi-
cient bootstrap method for GMM in cross-section and 
panel data. We show that our method improves on the 
standard asymptotic approximation under certain regu-
larity conditions. We also illustrate that the improve-
ment can be large, particularly in dynamic panel data 
models, using Monte Carlo simulations and an empiri-
cal example. 
Hall and Horowitz (1996) previously proposed a 
bootstrap for GMM. Their approach is based on center-
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ing the moment conditions in GMM, while ours is 
based on bootstrapping the original moment conditions 
with an efficient estimator of the distribution. Our 
approach has a computational advantage in that the 
bootstrap does not require modifying the form of the 
estimator. Also, our approach is asymptotically effi-
cient relative to theirs. On the other hand, their 
approach has wider applicability than ours does 
because they cover dependent data and we do not. 
The bootstrap uses an estimate of the distribution of 
the data to form an estimate of the distribution of a sta-
tistic. Under certain conditions, the improved approxi-
mation to the distribution of the statistic can be 
expressed in a form similar to an Edgeworth expansion. 
These expansions are based on large sample approxi-
mations that are of higher order in the sample size than 
the usual asymptotic approximation. There are also 
other approaches to improvements in approximation, 
including those of Bekker (1994) and Staiger and Stock 
(1997). Although to date there have been few compari-
sons ofthese different approaches, the bootstrap 
appears to work well in some examples where the 
parameters are well identified and there are many overi-
dentifying restrictions. 
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